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ARTHUR MELVILLE AND MARSHA UTAIN
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In September of 1980, the plaintiffs, Hansens, acquired
the real property in Emery County, Utah which is the subject of
this action, the Green River Motel.

Plaintiff Hansens, by their

own admission, never inspected the property.

(Tr. 74) .

In the

same month, plaintiffs sold the motel to Synvest Corporation, a
Nevada corporation, by a Uniform Real Estate Contract (Exhibit
2).

The sale price set forth on the contract was Five Hundred

Sixty-five

Thousand

($565,000.00)

Dollars.

The

contract

was

signed by all the plaintiffs as sellers and on behalf of Synvest
Corporation as buyer by Boyd Hansen, Vice President.

The property was sold by Synvest Corporation to The
Green River Group by an undated Uniform Real Estate Contract, for
the

amount

Dollars.

of

Six

(Exhibit

Hundred
3).

Forty-five

The delivery

Thousand
date

($645,000.00)

for the property,

September 1, 1980, payments and other conditions of the contract
were substantially identical with those of the contract between
plaintiffs and defendant Synvest.
signed

the

Synvest—Green

Boyd Hansen, as Vice President

River Group

contract

on behalf of

Synvest as seller, and Ramon Pratt signed on behalf of Green
River Group as a partner, as buyer.

The plaintiff Hansens did

not learn of the sale by Synvest to Green River Group until four
months after it took place.

(Tr. 44-45).

Green River Group took over the operation of the motel
in approximately September of 1980.

(Tr. 126).

The motel at

that time was in a state of disrepair; the roof leaked, the sewer
system did not operate properly, the motel sign was blown down,
and the premises were dirty and trashy.
motel structure
143) .

The

itself was approximately

Green

River

Group

spent

in

(Tr. 136-141) .
25 years old.
excess

of

The
(Tr.

Fifty-six

Thousand ($56,000.00) Dollars in repairs and upkeep on the motel.
(Tr. 130).
The

payments

under

the

contracts

were

made

only

sporadically, with the last payment being made in December of
1983.
made

Plaintiff Brent Hansen testified that the payments were
by

defendant

Synvest.

(Tr.

79).

Green

River

Group

quitclaimed the property back to Synvest Corporation on February

29, 1984.

(Exhibit 15).

Green River Group and Synvest also

executed an agreement on that date rescinding the Uniform Real
Estate Contract previously

entered

into by the parties with

respect to the Green River Motel.

(Exhibit 16). The agreement

was

by Gilbert Allard

signed

on behalf

of Synvest

as Vice

President, and on behalf of Green River Group by Nolan Wathen,
Brent Pratt and Ramon Pratt as partners.

This action by the

plaintiffs followed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The contract between defendant Synvest and defendant
Green River Group was not an assumption by Green River Group of
Synvestfs contract with the Hansens and was not sufficient to
bind Green River Group or its individual partners to the personal
obligation of the defendant Synvest, for purposes of a deficiency
judgment.

Since the contract between Synvest and Green River

Group benefited the plaintiff Hansens only incidentally, they
cannot recover under a third party beneficiary theory.

There was

insufficient evidence introduced at trial to indicate an alter
ego relationship between Synvest and Green River Group.

There

was insufficient evidence introduced at trial to find Green River
Group liable for waste.

Because of these deficiencies, neither

Green River Group nor any of the partners thereof are liable on a
deficiency judgment to the plaintiff Hansens.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
GREEN RIVER GROUP DID NOT ASSUME THE
UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF
HANSENS
AND
SYNVEST
CORPORATION, AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE
LIABLE
FOR
ANY
DEFICIENCY
AFTER
FORECLOSURE BY THE HANSENS.
The general rule where a party purchases real property
subject to a mortgage under an existing executory contract is
that such a purchaser does not assume the personal liability of
the original purchaser for the payment of the first contract,
unless he specifically agrees to do so, because the promise to
pay for the land is not of itself a covenant running with the
land.

Lisenby v. Newton, 52 P. 813 (California 1898); Howell v.

Kraft, 517 P.2d 203

(Washington 1974); Henock v. Yeamans, 340

F.2d 503 (1965); see dissenting opinion by Mr. Justice Tuckett in
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan v. King, 453 P. 2d 697 (Utah
1969).

And although the assumption of such an obligation may be

implied

from the circumstances, it is generally necessary to

establish that the assignee assumed the obligation by clear and
conclusive evidence.

Perkins v. Brown, 38 P.2d 253 (Washington

1934).
Here, the transaction between Synvest and Green River
Group was a separate contract.

Had the defendant Green River

Group intended to assume the obligations of defendant Synvest
with respect to plaintiff Hansens, they most likely would have
assumed the contract directly, using an assumption form.

This

theory of the facts is consistent, especially if one or two of
the officers of Synvest were also partners in the Green River
Group, because they would have been aware of all the implications
of the contract with the plaintiff Hansens.

However, all the

facts point to an armfs length transaction; the purchase price
paid

by

defendant

Green

River

Group

was

Eighty

Thousand

($80,000.00) Dollars higher than that paid by defendant Synvest;
the parties entered into a separate contract; defendant Synvest
paid the Hansens directly.
The plaintiffs1 reliance on Prudential Federal Savings
and Loan v. King, 453 P.2d 697 (Utah 1969) is misplaced under the
facts of the instant case.

In Prudential, the defendants King

assigned their interest as purchasers of real estate under a
Uniform Real Estate Contract to defendants Evans.

The Evans, in

turn, assigned their interest in the same contract to Rice and
Norton.

The payments under the contract were not made, and

plaintiff Prudential, who was itself an assignee from Maurer
Development, brought suit to foreclose the Uniform Real Estate
Contract

as

a

mortgage,

and

sought

defendants King, Evans, Rice and Norton.

deficiencies

against

The trial Court denied

the prayer for deficiency judgments against the assignees, and
Prudential appealed.

This Court reversed.

There is an important, substantive difference in the
Prudential

case

and

the

instant

case.

There

was

only

one

contract in that case, that being the original contract between
Maurer

Development

and

defendants

King.

All

subsequent

transactions were assignments on forms of assignment.

At no time

did any of the parties enter into a new contract to sell the
property.

Language in that contract, quoted by the Court, showed

that

assignees

the

contract.

had

specifically

accepted

that

original

Prudential, at 699.
It is clear that in Prudential the parties intended to

assign the original contract.

However, in the instant case,

there is no assignment, but an entirely new contract between
defendant Synvest and defendant Green River Group, which was made
subject to the mortgage contained in the original contract, and
which was obviously not intended as an assignment of the contract
between plaintiff Hansens and defendant Synvest.
language of that
representations,
hereto

with

contract
covenants

reference

to

states
or

".

. . that there are no

agreements

said

In fact, the

between

property

the parties

except

specifically set forth or attached hereto.

as

herein

Buyer agrees to be

bound by the conditions that appear in all underlying contract."
(Exhibit

3).

specifically

in

The
the

only

"underlying

agreement

between

contract"
defendant

mentioned
Synvest

and

defendant Green River Group was the contract with Joyce Nation.
Radley

v.

Smith,

313

P.2d

465

(Utah

1957),

is

inapposite to the instant case because it does not deal with the
transfer of real property subject to a mortgage, and it deals
with the responsibilities of an assignee vendor, not a subsequent
purchaser of property.

The plaintiffs in Radley were purchasing

apartment units of a building, and the defendant assignee vendor

refused to pay the taxes on the building or supply necessary
refrigeration and janitorial services.

The plaintiffs in Radley

were in a different position than the plaintiffs Hansen in the
instant case.

There, the plaintiffs had no recourse except a

personal suit against the defendant to compel her to provide the
necessary services to continue living at the apartments.

Here,

the plaintiffs Hansen have an adequate remedy in the foreclosure
process and the right of deficiency against the party with whom
they have contracted, defendant Synvest.
Also,

as

Mrs.

Justice

Tuckett

observed

in

his

dissenting opinion in the Prudential case, Section 164 (1) of the
Restatement of Contracts, which the Court relied upon in Radley,
contains the caveat at the beginning of the section that

ff

. . .

the statement of the benefits and burdens attached to successive
owners of property because of a contract in a prior conveyance or
lease is omitted . . . because the rules governing them are to
some extent different.11

Prudentialf at 700.
POINT II

PLAINTIFF HANSENS ARE AT BEST INCIDENTAL
BENEFICIARIES OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
SYNVEST AND GREEN RIVER GROUP AND
THEREFORE CANNOT RECOVER AGAINST GREEN
RIVER GROUP ON A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
CONTRACT THEORY.
The law is well settled in Utah that
A third party who is not a promisee and
who gave no consideration
has an
enforceable right by reason of a
contract made by two others (1) if he is
a creditor of the promisee or of some
other person and the contract calls for

a performance by the promisor
in
satisfaction of the obligation; or {2)
if the promised performance will be of
pecuniary benefit
to him and the
contract is so expressed as to give the
promisor reason to know that such
benefit is contemplated by the promisee
as one of the motivating causes of his
making the contract. (Emphasis added).
Schwinghammer

v.

Alexander,

446

P. 2d

at

415

(Utah

1968).

A third party who is within neither of these provisions

has no

right,

benefit him.
party

even though the performance will
Schwinghammerf

beneficiary

to have

at 415.
a right

incidentally

fl

Further,

[f]or a third

to enforce

a

right,

the

intention of the contracting parties to confer a separate and
distinct benefit upon the third party must be clear."

Rio Algom

Corporation v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d at 506 (Utah 1980).
In this case, the trial Court did not find a separate,
clear intention to benefit plaintiffs Hansen

in the contract

between defendants Synvest and Green River Group.
evidence in the record to support this finding:
Corporation gained Eighty Thousand

There is ample
1)

Synvest

($80,000.00) Dollars on the

sale to Green River Group over that they paid to the Hansens for
the property; 2)

There is much evidence that the property was in

a state of disrepair when Green River Group took possession of
the property.

Green River Group expended over Fifty-six Thousand

($56,000.00) Dollars in attempting to bring the Green River Motel
to a profitable posture.
repair of the motel.

Synvest did not spend any money in

All of this activity by Green River Group

benefitted Synvest primarily.

The contract was not so expressed

as to give Green River Group reason to know that Synvest intended
to benefit the plaintiffs*

That the plaintiff Hansens were bene-

fitted is incidental within the meaning of Utah law.
As

previously

pointed

out,

the

only

"underlying

obligation11 mentioned in the agreement between Synvest and Green
River Group was the Joyce Nation agreement.
River

had

intended

that

Green

River

If Synvest and Green

assume

the

contractual

obligation which Synvest had with plaintiffs Hansen, it would
have to be mentioned, to make plaintiffs anything other than
incidental beneficiaries.

There was no evidence introduced at

trial that points to such an intent.

To say that it should be

construed from the contract as it stands is pure speculation.
All the evidence points to an arm's length agreement between
Synvest and Green River Group.
Finally, it is clear from the quit claim deed and the
rescission of the contract between Synvest and Green River Group
that the parties intended that Green River should be freed from
any obligations under that contract, in consideration of what
they had already paid, both on the contract and in the repair of
the motel.
POINT III
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT GREEN RIVER
GROUP IS THE ALTER EGO OF SYNVEST
CORPORATION.
This Court has held that
[IJn order to disregard the corporate
entity, there must be a concurrence of
two circumstances; (1) there must be
Q

such unity of interest and ownership
that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individual no longer
exist, viz., the corporation is, in fact
the alter ego of one or a few
individuals; and (2) the observance of
the corporate form would sanction a
fraud,
promote
injustice,
or
an
inequitable result would follow.
Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc., 678 P.2d at 794
(Utah 1984).

In the Messick case, this Court refused to pierce

the corporate veil because

1) there was no evidence of the

corporation's neglect of the "formalities requirement" associated
with the first prong of the test, that is, it was not shown that
the corporation did not observe the statutory requirements of a
corporation.

Messick, at page 794.

Also, there was no evidence

received that observance of the corporate entity would sanction
fraud,

promote

injustice,

or

produce

an

inequitable

result.

Messick, at 794.
The same result must be reached in the instant case
because there is no evidence before the Court that Synvest did
not observe the statutory requirements.
presented

at trial:

There was no evidence

1) as to who were the stockholders of

Synvest Corporation; 2) whether stock had been issued; 3) who the
officers were, other than Boyd Hansen; 4) whether Synvest had
filed Articles

of

Incorporation;

5) that

Synvest

was

indeed

undercapitalized as the plaintiffs claim.
There was no evidence introduced at trial, and properly
before the Court, that Ramon Pratt was involved with Synvest
Corporation

in

any

way.

Exhibits

C

and

D,

appended

to

plaintifffs apellate brief, were not introduced into evidence at
trial and should not be considered here as evidence.

Exhibit D,

a note purportedly signed by Ramon Pratt, has no foundation,
other

than

plaintifffs

assertion

that

it

was

given

as

consideration for the contract between Synvest and plaintiffs
Hansen.

It may have been part of a different transaction.
Plaintiffs assert that because the quit claim deed from

Green River Group to Synvest recites consideration of only Ten
($10.00) Dollars that collusion between the two entities must
exist.

It is a common practice to recite consideration of One

($1.00) Dollar or Ten ($10.00) Dollars when conveying property,
to keep the true amount of a transaction from public knowledge.
There is no evidence before the Court as to what consideration
actually passed from one entity to another.
The second prong of the alter ego test laid out in
Messick is if leaving the corporate entity intact would sanction
fraud, promote injustice or produce an inequitable result.

The

record in this case is devoid of any evidence that such a result
would follow if the Court here leaves the Synvest entity intact.
The plaintiffs bought the motel property without ever inspecting
it.

They knew they were selling to a corporation and not to

individuals.

They made no effort to investigate the corporation

or the proposed sale in any manner, not even to see if the motel
could be profitable.

Because the plaintiffs did not use good

business judgment nor investigate an investment does not mean
that they have been defrauded.

A bad investment is not unjust,

11

but it would be unjust for the Court to make the partners of the
Green River Group pay for the plaintiffs1 errors in judgment.
Finally, there is no one to whom the Court could turn
to order compensation if the corporate veil were pierced.

There

was no evidence presented at trial to show who owned Synvest
Corporation or its stock.
POINT IV
THERE
IS
INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE
TO
CONCLUDE THAT WASTE HAD BEEN COMMITTED
BY THE GREEN RIVER GROUP WHILE THEY WERE
IN POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY.
Waste has been defined as ". . . the destruction,
misuse, alteration, or neglect of premises by one lawfully in
possession thereof, to the prejudice of the estate or interest
therein of another.11

Jowdy v. Guerinf 457 P.2d at 748 (Arizona

1969) . Waste may be voluntary, such as deliberate destruction of
premises or buildings, or negligent, such as the failure of a
tenant to exercise ordinary care of premises under his control.
Jowdy, at 748.

In Jowdy, the Arizona Supreme Court set forth

three elements essential to a cause of action for waste:
1.

There must be an act constituting waste;

2.

The act must be done by one legally in possession;

3.

The act must be to the prejudice of the estate or
interest therein of another.

Jowdy, at 748.

In the instant case, the plaintiffs

presented the trial Court with a list of expenses which they
incurred in repairs and maintenance of the motel property since

they took possession

in 1984.

They

insist that because the

repairs were needed it must have been the acts of the defendant
Green River Group which caused

the disrepair.

testimony

showed

at trial conclusively

However, the

that not

one

of the

plaintiffs had seen the motel property before, or after, they
purchased it in 1980.
property in 1984.

In fact the plaintiffs first saw the

The plaintiffs did not produce one witness who

saw the motel in 1980.

The sole witness who had seen the motel

in 1980, Brent Pratt, testified that the motel was in a state of
disrepair when Green River Group took over the property.

The

trial Court correctly ruled that waste could not be assessed
against

Green River Group

absent

some proof

that waste was

committed by that defendant.
Additionally, the testimony at trial indicated that the
motel was approximately 25 years old.

Waste does not include

ordinary depreciation of property due to age and normal use over
a short period of time, Moore v. Phillips, 627 P.2d 831 (Kansas
1981) .

There was no evidence introduced at trial to show the

effects of depreciation, as opposed to waste.

To simply show

that what the plaintiffs paid out in expenses on the motel in
1984, yet not show a causal connection between those expenses and
some act, or omission, on the part of the Green River Group, or
to fail to show that the same is not due to depreciation, is not
adequate to support a cause of action for waste.

The trial Court

allowed a judgment for waste against Synvest corporation simply
because they failed to appear for the trial.

13

CONCLUSION
From an analysis of the facts presented at trial, and
the applicable law, it is clear that the Green River Group and
its individual partners cannot be held liable for a deficiency
judgment in favor of the Hansens.

The Green River Group did not

assume Synvest Corporation's contract with the plaintiffs.

The

plaintiffs are not third party beneficiaries of that contract.
There is insufficient evidence introduced at trial to show that
Synvest was the alter ego of the Green River Group.

There was

insufficient evidence introduced to hold the Green River Group
liable for any acts of waste.
The trial Court ruled correctly on all aspects of this
case and the judgment of that Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

of January, 1986.
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